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Abstract
In this work, we exploit the ill-posedness of linear inverse problems to design algorithms to
release differentially private data or measurements of the physical system. We discuss the spectral
requirements on a matrix such that only a small amount of noise is needed to achieve privacy
and contrast this with the ill-conditionedness. We then instantiate our framework with several
diffusion operators and explore recovery via `1 constrained minimisation. Our work indicates that
it is possible to produce locally private sensor measurements that both keep the exact locations of
the heat sources private and permit recovery of the “general geographic vicinity” of the sources.
1 Introduction
Imagine dropping a few drops of ink into a glass of water. The ink drops spread out, forming compli-
cated tendrils that coil back on each other, expanding quickly, until all of the ink has diffused and the
liquid is a slightly darker shade than its original colour. There is no physical process by which you can
make the diffusing ink coalesce back into its original droplets. This intuition is at the heart of what
we call computational cloaking. Because it is physically impossible to reconstruct the ink droplet
exactly, we should be able to hide or keep private in a precise sense its original location. When math-
ematicians and physicists refer to cloaking, they usually mean transformation optics [Greenleaf et al.,
2009], the design of optical devices with special customised effects on wave propagation. In this pa-
per, we exploit the ill-conditionedness of inverse problems to design algorithms to release differentially
private measurements of the physical system.
We are motivated by the explosion in the power and ubiquity of lightweight (thermal, light, motion,
etc.) sensors. These data offer important benefits to society. For example, thermal sensor data now
plays an important role in controlling HVAC systems and minimising energy consumption in smart
buildings [Lin et al., 2002, Beltran et al., 2013]. However, these sensors also collect data inside intimate
spaces, homes and workspaces, so the information contained in the data is sensitive. To continue with
the example of thermal sensor data, one might consider sources of heat to be people, whose locations
we aim to keep private.
Our work indicates that it is possible to produce locally differentially private sensor measurements
that both keep the exact locations of the heat sources private and permit recovery of the general
vicinity of the sources. That is, the locally private data can be used to recover an estimate, fˆ , that is
close to the true source locations, f0, in the Earth Mover Distance (EMD). This is the second aspect
to our work: algorithms that reconstruct sparse signals with error guarantees with respect to EMD
(rather than the more traditional `1 or `2 error in which accurate recovery is insurmountable).
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1.1 Source Localization
Suppose that we have a vector f0 of length n that represents the strengths and positions of our
“sources.” The ith entry represents the strength of the source at position i. Further, suppose that we
take m linear measurements of our source vector; we observe
y = Mf0
where M represents some generic linear physical transformation of our original data. Let us also assume
that the source vector f0 consists of at most k sources (or k non-zero entries). The straightforward
linear inverse problem is to determine f0, given M and a noisy version of y. More precisely, given
noisy measurements y˜ = Mf0 +N(0, σ
2Im), can we produce an estimate fˆ that is still useful?
For physical processes such as diffusion, intuitively, we can recover the approximate geographic
vicinity of the source. This is exactly the concept of closeness captured by the Earth Mover Distance
(EMD). Thus, in this paper, we aim to recover fˆ that is close to f0 in the EMD. The EMD can
be defined between any two probability distributions on a finite discrete metric space (Ω, d(·, ·)). It
computes the amount of work required to transform one distribution into the other.
Definition 1 [Rubner et al., 2000] Let P = {(x1, p1), · · · , (xn, pn)} and Q = {(x1, q1), · · · , (xn, qn)}
be two probability distributions on the discrete space {x1, · · · , xn}. Now, let
f∗ = arg min
f∈[0,1]n×n
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
fijd(xi, xj) (1)
s.t. fij ≥ 0 ∀i, j ∈ [m],
n∑
j=1
fij ≤ pi ∀i ∈ [m],
n∑
i=1
fij ≤ qi ∀i ∈ [n], and
n∑
i=1
n∑
i=1
fij = 1.
then EMD(P,Q) =
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 f
∗
ijd(xi, xj).
1.2 Differential Privacy
To understand our definition of cloaking, we give a very brief introduction to differential privacy in this
section. A more in-depth introduction can be found in Dwork and Roth [2014]. Differential privacy has
emerged over the past decade as the leading definition of privacy for privacy-preserving data analysis.
A database is a vector D in Dn for some data universe D. We call two databases D, D′ adjacent or
“neighbouring” if ‖D −D′‖0 = 1.
Definition 2 ((, δ)-Differential Privacy) [Dwork et al., 2006] A randomised algorithm A is (, δ)-
differentially private if for all adjacent databases D, D′ and events E,
P(A(D) ∈ E) ≤ eP(A(D′) ∈ E) + δ.
To understand this definition suppose the database D contains some sensitive information about
Charlie and the data analyst, Lucy, produces some statistic A(D) about the database D via a differ-
entially private algorithm. Then Lucy can give Charlie the following guarantee: an adversary given
access to the output A(D) can not determine whether the database was D or D′, where D has Charlie’s
true data and D′ has Charlie’s data replaced with an arbitrary element of D.
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1.3 Computational Cloaking Precisely
First, we clarify exactly what information we would like to keep private. We consider the coordinates
of f0 to be our data, that is the locations of the sources are what we would like to keep private. We
assume that there exists a metric d(·, ·) on the set of possible source locations, which induces the EMD
on the set of source vectors. For the remainder of this work, we will assume that the metric d is such
that every pair of source locations is connected by a path that travels via neighbours.
When the matrix M represents a physical process, we usually cannot hope to keep the existence
of a source private and also recover an estimation to f0 that is close in the EMD. However, it may
be possible to keep the exact location private while allowing recovery of the “general vicinity” of the
source. In fact, we will show in Section 4 that this is possible for diffusion on the discrete 1-dimensional
line and in Section 5 that we can generalise these results to diffusion on a general graph. We are going
narrow our definition of “neighbouring” databases to capture this idea.
Definition 3 For α > 0, two source vectors f0 and f
′
0 are α-neighbours if
EMD(f0, f
′
0) ≤ α.
The larger α is, the less stringent the neighbouring condition is, so the more privacy we are providing.
This definition has two important instances. We can move a source of weight 1 by α units, hiding the
location of a large heat source (like a fire) within a small area. Also, we can move a source with weight
α by 1 unit, hiding the location that small heat source (like a person) over a much larger area. We
will usually drop the α when referring to neighbouring vectors.
A locally differentially private algorithm is a private algorithm in which the individual data points
are made private before they are collated by the data analyst. In many of our motivating examples the
measurements yi are at distinct locations prior to being transmitted by a data analyst (for example,
at the sensors). Thus, the “local” part of the title refers to the fact that we consider algorithms
where each measurement, yi, is made private individually. This is desirable since the data analyst (e.g.
landlord, government) is often the entity the consumer would like to be protected against. Also, it is
often the case that the data must be communicated via some untrusted channel [Walters et al., 2007,
FTC, 2015]. Usually this step would involve encrypting the data, incurring significant computational
and communication overhead. However, if the data is made private prior to being sent, then there
is less need for encryption. We then wish to use this locally differentially private data to recover an
estimate to the source vector that is close in the EMD. The structure of the problem is outlined in the
following diagram:
f0
M
ym
y1
A
A
y˜m
y˜1
R
fˆ
Design algorithms A and R such that:
1. (Privacy) For all neighbouring source vectors f0 and f
′
0, indices i, and Borel measurable sets E
we have
P(A((Mf0)i) ∈ E) ≤ eP(A(Mf ′0)i ∈ E) + δ.
2. (Utility) EMD(f0, fˆ) is small.
3
1.4 Related Work
An in-depth survey on differential privacy and its links to machine learning and signal processing can
be found in [Sarwate and Chaudhuri, 2013]. The body of literature on general and local differential
privacy is vast and so we restrict our discussion to work that is directly related. There is a growing
body of literature of differentially private sensor data [Liu et al., 2012, Li et al., 2015, Wang et al., 2016,
Jelasity and Birman, 2014, Eibl and Engel, 2016]. Much of this work is concerned with differentially
private release of aggregate statistics derived from sensor data and the difficulty in maintaining privacy
over a period of time (called the continual monitoring problem).
Connections between privacy and signal recovery have been explored previously in the literature.
Dwork et al. [2007] considered the recovery problem with noisy measurements where the matrix M
has i.i.d. standard Gaussian entries. Newer results of Bun et al. [2014] can be interpreted in a similar
light where M is a binary matrix. Compressed sensing has also been used in the privacy literature as a
way to reduce the amount of noise needed to maintain privacy [Li et al., 2011, Roozgard et al., 2016].
There are also several connections between sparse signal recovery and inverse problems [Farmer
et al., 2013, Burger et al., 2010, Haber, 2008, Landa et al., 2011]. The heat source identification
problem is severely ill-conditioned and, hence, it is known that noisy recovery is impossible in the
common norms like `1 and `2. This has resulted in a lack of interest in developing theoretical bounds
[Li et al., 2014], thus the mathematical analysis and numerical algorithms for inverse heat source
problems are still very limited.
To the best of the author’s knowledge, the papers that are most closely related to this work are
Li et al. [2014], Beddiaf et al. [2015] and Bernstein and Fernandex-Granda [2017]. All these papers
attempt to circumvent the condition number lower bounds by changing the error metric to capture
“the recovered solution is geographically close to the true solution”, as in this paper. Our algorithm
is the same as Li, et al., who also consider the Earth Mover Distance (EMD). Our upper bound is a
generalisation of theirs to source vectors with more than one source. Beddiaf, et al. follows a line of
work that attempts to find the sources using `2-minimisation and regularisation. In work that was
concurrent to ours, Bernstein et al. also considered heat source location, framed as deconvolution of
the Gaussian kernel. They proved that a slight variant of Basis Pursuit Denoising solves the problem
exactly assuming enough sensors and sufficient separability between sources. They also arrive at a
similar result to Theorem 14 for the noisy case [Bernstein and Fernandex-Granda, 2017, Theorem
2.7].
2 Privacy of measurements and Ill-conditioned Matrices
2.1 The Private Algorithm
Because we assume that our sensors are lightweight computationally, the algorithm A is simply for
each sensor to add Gaussian noise locally to its own measurement before sending to the perturbed
measurement to the central node1. The question then is; how much noise should we add to maintain
privacy? The following lemma says, essentially, that the standard deviation of the noise added to a
statistic should be proportional to how much the statistic can vary between neighbouring data sets. Let
g : Dn → Rn be a function and let 42g = maxD,D′neighbours ‖g(D)− g(D′)‖2 (called the `2 sensitivity
of g).
Lemma 4 (The Gaussian Mechanism) [Dwork and Roth, 2014] Let  > 0, δ > 0 and σ =
2 ln(1.25/δ)42g
 then
A(D) ∼ g(D) +N(0, σ2In)
1Gaussian noise is not the only option to achieve privacy. There has been some work on the optimal type of noise to
add to achieve privacy [Geng and Viswanath, 2016].
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is an (, δ)-differentially private algorithm.
Let us apply the Gaussian mechanism to the general linear inverse problem. As we discussed pre-
viously, ill-conditioned source localization problems behave poorly under addition of noise. Intuitively,
this should mean we need only add a small amount of noise to mask the original data. We show that
this statement is partially true. However, there is a fundamental difference between the notion of a
problem being ill-conditioned (as defined by the condition number) and being easily kept private. Let
Mi be the ith column of M .
Proposition 5 With α > 0 and the definition of α-neighbours presented in Definition 3, we have
A(Mf0) ∼Mf0 + 2 log(1.25/δ)42(M)

N(0, Im)
is a (, δ)-differentially private algorithm where
42(M) = α max
ei,ej neighbours
‖Mi −Mj‖2
Proof: Suppose f0 and f
′
0 are α-neighbours and let fkl be the optimal flow from f0 to f
′
0 (as defined
in Definition 1) so f0 =
∑
k,l fklek and f
′
0 =
∑
k,l fklel, where ek are the standard basis vectors. Then
‖Mf0−Mf ′0‖2 ≤
∑
k,l
fkl‖Mek −Mel‖2
=
∑
k,l
fkld(ek, el)
 max
i,jneighbours
‖Mej −Mei‖2
≤ α max
i,jneighbours
‖Mei −Mej‖2
Then the fact that the algorithm is (, δ)-differentially private follows from Lemma 4.
Let (s1, · · · , smin{n,m}) be the spectrum of M , enumerated such that si ≤ si+1. The condition
number, κ2(M), is a measure of how ill-conditioned this inverse problem is. It is defined as
κ2(M) := max
e,b∈Rm\{0}
‖M+b‖2
‖M+e‖2
‖e‖2
‖b‖2 =
smax{m,n}(M)
s1(M)
where M+ is the pseudo inverse of M . The larger the condition number the more ill-conditioned the
problem is Belsley et al. [1980].
The following matrix illustrates the difference between how ill-conditioned a matrix is and how
much noise we need to add to maintain privacy. Suppose
M =
(
1 0
0 ρ
)
where ρ < 1 is small. While this problem is ill-conditioned, κ2(M) = 1/ρ is large, we still need to add
considerable noise to the first coordinate of Mx0 to maintain privacy.
A necessary condition for ∆2(M) to be small is that the matrix M is almost rank 1, that is, the
spectrum should be almost 1-sparse. In contrast the condition that κ2(M) is large is only a condition
on the maximum and minimum singular values. The following lemma says that if the amount of noise
we need to add, 42(M), is small then the problem is necessarily ill-conditioned.
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Lemma 6 Let M be a matrix such that ‖M‖2 = 1 then
42(M) ≥ α
κ2(M)
,
where α is the parameter in Definition 3.
Proof: Suppose ei is a neighbouring source to e1 then
1
κ2(M)
= min
rankE<min{m,n}
‖M − E‖2 ≤ ‖M − [Mj M2 M3 · · ·Mn]‖2 ≤ ‖M1 −Mi‖2.
Since we could have replaced 1 and i with any pair of neighbours we have
1
κ2(M)
≤ min
i,jneighbours
‖Mi −Mj‖2 = ∆2(M)
α
.
The following lemma gives a characterization of 42(M) in terms of the spectrum of M . It verifies
that the matrix M must be almost rank 1, in the sense that the spectrum should be dominated by the
largest singular value.
Lemma 7 If ∆2(M) ≤ ν, then |‖Mi‖2 − ‖Mj‖2| ≤ να for any pair of neighbouring locations ei and
ej and |
∑
i 6=min{m,n} si| ≤ (n+1)
3/2ρν
α , where ρ is the diameter of the space of source locations.
Conversely, if |∑i6= min{m,n} si| ≤ να and |‖Mi‖2 − ‖Mj‖2| ≤ να then ∆2(M) ≤ 4ν.
Proof: Let ei and ej be neighbouring sources. Now, assume ∆2(M) ≤ ν then
|‖Mi‖2 − ‖Mj‖2| ≤ ‖Mi − Mj‖2 ≤ ν
α
.
Suppose wlog that maxi ‖Mi‖2 = ‖M1‖2 and let M ′ = [M1 · · ·M1] be the matrix whose columns are all
duplicates of the first column of M . Recall that the trace norm of a matrix is the sum of its singular
values and for any matrix, ‖M‖tr ≤
√
min{m,n}‖M‖F and ‖M‖2 ≤ ‖M‖F . Since M ′ is rank 1,
‖M ′‖tr = ‖M ′‖2 = smin{m,n}, thus,
|
min{m,n}−1∑
i=1
si| ≤ |‖M‖tr − ‖M ′‖tr|+ |‖M ′‖tr − smin{m,n}|
≤ ‖M ′ −M‖tr + |‖M ′‖2 − ‖M‖2|
≤ (
√
min{n,m}+ 1)‖M ′ −M‖F
≤ (
√
min{n,m}+ 1)ρ(n− 1) ν
α
Conversely, suppose |∑i 6=min{m,n} si| ≤ να and |‖Mi‖2 − ‖Mj‖2| ≤ να . Using the SVD we know,
M =
∑
siUi ⊗ Vi where Ui and Vi are the left and right singular values, respectively. Thus,
‖Mi −Mj‖2 = ‖
∑
k
sk(Uk)iVk −
∑
k
sk(Uk)jVk‖2
≤ smin{m,n}|(U1)i − (U1)j |+ ν
α
.
Also, να ≥ ‖Mi‖2 − ‖Mj‖2 ≥ smin{m,n}(U1)i − να − smin{m,n}(U1)j − να so|(U1)i − (U1)j | ≤ 3 ναsmin{m,n} .
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2.2 Backdoor Access via Pseudo-randomness
It has been explored previously in the privacy literature that replacing a random noise generator
with cryptographically secure pseudorandom noise generator in an efficient differentially private algo-
rithm creates an algorithm that satisfies a weaker version of privacy, computational differential privacy
[Mironov et al., 2009]. While differential privacy is secure against any adversary, computational dif-
ferential privacy is secure against a computationally bounded adversary. In the following definition, κ
is a security parameter that controls various quantities in our construction.
Definition 8 (Simulation-based Computational Differential Privacy (SIM-CDP)) [Mironov
et al., 2009] A family, {Mκ}κ∈N, of probabilistic algorithms Mκ : Dn → Rκ is n-SIM-CDP if
there exists a family of κ-differentially private algorithms {An}n∈N, such that for every probabilis-
tic polynomial-time adversary P, every polynomial p(·), every sufficiently large κ ∈ N, every dataset
D ∈ Dn with n ≤ p(κ), and every advice string zκ of size at p(κ), it holds that,
|P[Pκ(Mκ(D) = 1)− P[Pκ(Aκ(D) = 1)| ≤ negl(κ).
That is, Mκ and Aκ are computationally indistinguishable.
The transition to pseudo-randomness, of course, has the obvious advantage that pseudo-random
noise is easier to generate than truly random noise. In our case, it also has the additional benefit that,
given access to the seed value, pseudo-random noise can be removed, allowing us to build a “backdoor”
into the algorithm. Suppose we have a trusted data analyst who wants access to the most accurate
measurement data, but does not have the capacity to protect sensitive data from being intercepted in
transmission. Suppose also that this party stores the seed value of each sensor and the randomness
in our locally private algorithm A is replaced with pseudo-randomness. Then, the consumers are
protected against an eavesdropping computationally bounded adversary, and the trusted party has
access to the noiseless 2 measurement data. This solution may be preferable to simply encrypting
the data during transmission since there may be untrusted parties who we wish to give access to the
private version of the data.
Corollary 9 (Informal) Replacing the randomness in Proposition 13 with pseudo-randomness pro-
duces a local simulation-based computational differentially private algorithm for the same task. In
addition, any trusted party with access to the seed of the random number generator can use the output
of the private algorithm to generate the original data.
3 Recovery algorithm and Examples
We claimed that the private data is both useful and differentially private. In this Chapter we discuss
recovering an estimate of f0 from the noisy data y˜. Algorithms for recovering a sparse vector from
noisy data have been explored extensively in the compressed sensing literature. However, theoretical
results in this area typically assume that the measurement matrix M is sufficiently nice. Diffusion
matrices are typically very far from satisfying the niceness conditions required for current theoretical
results. Nonetheless, in this Chapter we discuss the use of a common sparse recovery algorithm, Basis
Pursuit Denoising (BPD), for ill-conditioned matrices. The use of BPD to recover source vectors with
the heat kernel was proposed by Li et al. [2014], who studied the case of a 1-sparse source vector.
We begin with a discussion of known results for BPD from the compressed sensing literature. While
the theoretical results for BPD do not hold in any meaningful way for ill-conditioned diffusion matrices,
we present them here to provide context for the use of this algorithm to recover a sparse vector. We
then proceed to discussing the performance of BPD on private data in some examples: diffusion on
the 1D unit interval and diffusion on general graphs.
2This data may still be corrupted by sensor noise that was not intentionally injected
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3.1 Basis Pursuit Denoising
Basis Pursuit Denoising minimises the `1-norm subject to the constraint that the measurements of the
proposed source vector fˆ should be close in the `2-norm to the noisy sensor measurements. To simplify
our discussion, let σ be the standard deviation of the noise added to the sensor measurements. The
bound σ
√
m in Algorithm 1 is chosen to ensure f0 is a feasible point with high probability.
Input: M,σ > 0, y˜
fˆ = arg minf∈[0,1]n ‖f‖1 s.t. ‖Mf − y˜‖2 ≤ σ
√
m
Output: fˆ ∈ [0, 1]n
Algorithm 1: R: Basis Pursuit Denoising
The bound σ
√
m in Algorithm 1 is chosen to ensure f0 is a feasible point with high probability.
Lemma 10 Hsu et al. [2012] Let ν ∼ N(0, σ2Im) then for all t > 0,
P[‖ν‖22 > σ2(m+ 2
√
mt+ 2t)] ≤ e−t.
So for large m and small ρ, we have ‖ν‖2 ≤ (1 + ρ)σ
√
m with high probability.
3.2 Basis Pursuit Denoising for RIP matrices
In order to present the results in this section cleaner, rather than keeping track of σ
√
m we introduce
parameters α, β > 0. Basis Pursuit Denoising
arg min
f∈[0,1]n
‖f‖1 s.t. ‖Mf − y˜‖2 ≤ α (2)
is the convex relaxation of the problem we would like to solve, `0-minimisation:
arg min
f∈[0,1]n
‖f‖0 s.t. ‖Mf − y˜‖2 ≤ β. (3)
The minimum of the `0 norm is the sparsest solution. Unfortunately, this version of the problem is NP
hard, so in order to find an efficient algorithm we relax to the `1 norm. The `1 norm is the “smallest”
convex function that places a unit penalty on unit coefficients and zero penalty on zero coefficients.
Since the relaxation is convex, we can use convex optimisation techniques to solve it. In the next
section we’ll discuss an appropriate optimisation algorithm. In this section, we focus on when the
solution to the relaxed version (2) is similar to the solution for Equation (3).
We call the columns of M , denoted by Mi, atoms. We will assume for this section that ‖Mi‖2 = 1
for all i. Notice that the vector Mf0 is the linear combination of the Mi with coefficients given by
the entries of f0 so we can think of recovering the vector f0 as recovering the coefficients
3. A key
parameter of the matrix M is its coherence:
µ = max
i,j
|〈Mi,Mj〉|
Similar to 42(M), the coherence is a measure how similar the atoms of M . The larger the coherence
is, the more similar the atoms are, which makes them difficult to distinguish. For accurate sparse
recovery, it is preferential for the coherence to be small. The following theorem relates the solutions
to Equation (2) and (3).
3This is where BPD gets its name. We are pursuing the basis vectors that make up Mf0.
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Theorem 11 [Tropp, 2004, Theorem C] Suppose k ≤ 13µ−1. Suppose fopt is a k-sparse solution to
Equation (3) with β = α√
1+6k
. Then the solution fˆ produced from Algorithm 1 satisfies
• supp(fˆ) ⊂supp(fopt)
• fˆ is no sparser than a solution to Equation (3) with β = α
• ‖fˆ − fopt‖2 ≤ α
√
3/2
Theorem 11 says that if the matrix M is coherent then the solution to the convex relaxation
(Algorithm 1) is at least as sparse as a solution to (3) with error tolerance somewhat smaller than
α. Also, fˆ only recovers source locations that also appear in fopt, although it may not recover all of
the source locations that appear in fopt. The final property bounds the weight assigned to any source
identified in fopt and not fˆ . If y˜ = Mf0 + Z then the worst case discrepancy between f0 and fopt
occurs when Z concentrates its weight on a single atom. In our case, the noise vector Z has i.i.d.
Gaussian coordinates and hence is unlikely to concentrate its weight.
The key property for exact recovery of f0, rather than fopt, is that M is a near isometry on
sparse vectors. A matrix M satisfies the Restricted Isometry Property (RIP) of order k with restricted
isometry constant δk if δk is the smallest constant such that for all k-sparse vectors x,
(1− δk)‖x‖22 ≤ ‖Mx‖22 ≤ (1 + δk)‖x‖22.
If f0 is a feasible point and δk is small, then we can guarantee that f0 and fˆ are close in the `2
norm.
Theorem 12 [Cande`s, 2008, Theorem 1.2] Assume δ2k <
√
2 − 1 and ‖Z‖2 ≤ α and f0 is k-sparse.
Then the solution fˆ to (2) satisfies
‖fˆ − f0‖2 ≤ Cα
for some constant C.
The exact constant C is given explicitly in Cande`s [2008] and is rather small. For example, when
δ2k = 0.2, we have C ≤ 8.5.
Theorems 11 and 12 only provide meaningful results for matrices with small µ and δk. Unfortu-
nately, the coherence and restricted isometry constants for ill-conditioned matrices, and in particular
diffusion matrices, are both large. It is somewhat surprising then that BPD recovers well in the
examples we will explore in the following sections.
4 Diffusion on the Unit Interval
Let us define the linear physical transformation explicitly for heat source localization. To distinguish
this special case from the general, we denote the measurement matrix by A (instead of M). For heat
diffusion, we have a diffusion constant µ and a time t at which we take our measurements. Let T = µt
in what follows. Let g(x, t) = 1√
4piT
e
−|x|2
4T . Let n > 0 and suppose the support of f is contained in the
discrete set { 1n , · · · , 1}. Let m > 0 and suppose we take m measurements at locations 1m , · · · , 1 so yi
is the measurement of the sensor at location im at time t and we have
y = Af0 where Aij = g
(
i
n
− j
m
, t
)
.
The heat kernel, A, is severely ill-posed due to the fact that as heat dissipates, the measurement
vectors for different source vectors become increasingly close Weber [1981]. Figure 1 shows the typical
9
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Figure 1: f0 has unit peaks 0.76 and 0.24. The parameters are n = 100, m = 50, T = 0.05 and σ = 0.1.
The red line is f0, the blue (dashed) line is fˆ .
Table 1: Asymptotic upper bounds for private recovery assuming
√
T (
√
m
nT 1.5 + ke
−α2
4T ) ≤ c < 1.
Variable EMD
(
f0
‖f0‖1 ,
fˆ
‖fˆ‖1
)
n O(1 + 1√
n
)
m O(1)
T min{1, O(1 + 1
T
+ T 2.5e−α
2/4T )}
behaviour of Algorithm 1 with the matrix A. As can be seen in the figure, this algorithm returns an
estimate fˆ that is indeed close to f0 in the EMD but not close in more traditional norms like the `1
and `2 norms. This phenomenon was noticed by Li et al. [2014], who proved that if f0 consists of a
single source then EMD(f0, fˆ) is small where fˆ = R(y˜).
Proposition 13 With the definition of neighbours presented in Definition 3 and restricting to f0 ∈
[0, 1]n we have
42(A) = O
(
α
√
m
T 1.5
)
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Figure 2: Empirical results of computation of 42(A). Unless specified otherwise, m = 500 and t = 0.1.
In (2a), n = 500 and in (2c), n = 1000.
Proof: For all i ∈ [n] we have
‖Ai −Ai+1‖22 =
1
4piT
m∑
j=1
(
e
−( i
n
− j
m
)2
4T − e
−( i+1
n
− j
m
)2
4T
)2
=
1
4piT
m∑
j=1
e
−( i
n
− j
m
)2
2T
(
1− e
( i
n
− j
m
)2−( i+1
n
− j
m
)2
4T
)2
≤ 1
4piT
max
i∈[n]
max
j∈[m]
(
1− e
( i
n
− j
m
)2−( i+1
n
− j
m
)2
4T
)2 m∑
j=1
e
−( i
n
− j
m
)2
2T
Now,
∑m
j=1 e
−( i
n
− j
m
)2
2T ≤ m and
max
i∈[n]
max
j∈[m]
(
1− e
( i
n
− j
m
)2−( i+1
n
− j
m
)2
4T
)2
≤ max{(1− e −34nT )2, (1− e 24nT )2} = O
(
1
n2T 2
)
.
Therefore,
‖Ai −Ai+1‖2 = O
( √
m
nT 1.5
)
.
Figure 2 shows calculations of 42(A) with varying parameters. The vertical axes are scaled to
emphasise the asymptotics. These calculations suggest that the analysis in Proposition 13 is asymp-
totically tight in m, n and T .
Theorem 14 Suppose that f0 is a source vector, yˆ = R(y˜) and assume the following:
1. m
√
T/2 > 1
2.
√
2T < 1
3. |xi − xj | >
√
2T + 2A for some A > 0
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then w.h.p.
EMD
(
f0
‖f0‖1 ,
fˆ
‖fˆ‖1
)
≤ min
{
1, O
[
1
1−min{1, C}
(
1
k
√
T 1.5C√
T + 1
+ kmin{1, C}+ T
2C
(T + 1)k
)]}
where C = min
{
k,
√
T
[
σ + ke−A
2/4T
]}
.
Assumptions 1 and 2 state that m needs to be large enough that for each possible source and
we need to take the measurements before the heat diffuses too much. Assumption 3 says that
the sources need to be sufficiently far apart. We can remove this assumption by noting that ev-
ery source vector is close to a source vector whose sources are well separated and that for all f, f ′,
‖Af0 − Af ′0‖2 = O
( √
m
T 1.5 EMD(f0, f
′
0)
)
.
The result is a generalisation to source vectors with more than one source of a result of Li et al.
[2014] . Our proof is a generalisation of their proof and is contained in Section 6. In order to obtain a
recovery bound for the private data, we set σ =
( √
m
nT 1.5
)
. The asymptotics of this bound are contained
in Table 1. It is interesting to note that, unlike in the constant σ case, the error increases as T → 0
(as well as when T →∞). This is because as T → 0 the inverse problem becomes less ill-conditioned
so we need to add more noise.
The following theorem gives a lower bound on the estimation error of the noisy recovery problem.
Theorem 15 We have
inf
fˆ
sup
f0
E[EMD(f0, fˆ)] = Ω
(
min
{
1
2
,
T 1.5σ√
m
})
.
where inf fˆ is the infimum over all estimators fˆ : R
m → [0, 1]n, supf0 is the supremum over all
source vectors in [0, 1]n and y˜ is sampled from y +N(0, σ2Im).
Note that this lower bound matches our upper bound asymptotically in σ and is slightly loose in
T . It varies by a factor of
√
m from our theoretical upper bound. Experimental results (contained
in the extended version) suggest that the error decays like O(1 + 1√
m
). A consequence of Theorem
15 is that if two peaks are too close together, roughly at a distance of O
(
min{ 12 , T
1.5σ√
m
)
, then it is
impossible for an estimator to differentiate between the true source vector and the source vector that
has a single peak located in the middle. Before we prove Theorem 15 we need following generalisation
of the upper bound in Proposition 13.
Lemma 16 Suppose ‖f0‖1 = ‖f ′0‖1 = 1 then
‖Af0 −Af ′0‖2 = O
(√
m
T 1.5
EMD(f0, f
′
0)
)
Proof: Firstly, consider the single peak vectors ei and ej . Then noting that Aei = Ai, we have from
Proposition 13 that
‖Aei −Aej‖2 ≤
j−i−1∑
l=0
‖Aei+l −Aei+1+1‖2 ≤ O
(
|i− j|
√
m
nT 1.5
)
12
Now, let fij be the optimal flow from f0 to f
′
0 as described in Definition 1 so f0 =
∑
i,j fijei and
f ′0 =
∑
ij fijej . Then
‖Af0 −Af ′0‖2 ≤
∑
ij
fij‖Aei −Aej‖2 ≤ O
∑
ij
fij
∣∣∣∣ in − jn
∣∣∣∣ √mT 1.5
 = O(√m
T 1.5
EMD(f0, f
′
0)
)
The proof of Theorem 15 will be an application of Fano’s inequality, a classic result from information
theory. Suppose p, q are probability distributions on the same space. Then the Kullback-Leibler (KL)
divergence of p and q is defined byD(p||q) = ∫ (log dpdq )dp. For a collection T of probability distributions,
the KL diameter is defined by
dKL(T ) = sup
p,q∈T
D(p||q).
If (Ω, d) is a metric space,  > 0 and T ⊂ Ω, then we define the -packing number of T to be the largest
number of disjoint balls of radius  that can fit in T , denoted by M(, T, d). The following version of
Fano’s lemma is found in Yu [1997].
Lemma 17 (Fano’s Inequality.) Let (Ω, d) be a metric space and {Pθ | θ ∈ Ω} be a collection of
probability measures. For any totally bounded T ⊂ Ω and  > 0,
inf
θˆ
sup
θ∈Ω
Pθ
(
d2(θˆ(X), θ) ≥ 
2
4
)
≥ 1− dKL(T ) + 1
logM(, T, d) (4)
where the infimum is over all estimators.
Proof: [Proof of Theorem 15] For any source vector f0, let Pf0 be the probability distribution
induced on Rm by the process Af0 + N(0, σ2Im). Then the inverse problem becomes estimating
which distribution Pf0 the perturbed measurement vector is sampled from. Let f0 and f
′
0 be two
source vectors. Then
D(Pf0 ||Pf ′0) =
m∑
i=1
((Af0)i − (Af ′0)i)2
2σ2
=
1
2σ2
‖Af0 −Af ′0‖22 ≤ C
m
T 3σ2
(EMD(f0, f
′
0))
2
for some constant C, where we use the fact that the KL-divergence is additive over independent random
variables, along with Lemma 16. Now, let a = min{ 12 , T
1.5σ√
2C
√
m
}. Let T be the set consisting of the
following source vectors: e1/2, (1/2)e1/2−a/2 + (1/2)e1/2+a/2, (1/4)e1/2−a + (1/2)e1/2 + (1/4)e1/2+a,
(1/2)e1/2 + (1/2)e1/2+a, which are all at an EMD a from each other. Then dKL(T ) + 1 ≤ 3/2 and
logM(a, T,EMD) = 2. Thus, by Lemma 17,
inf
fˆ
sup
f0
E[EMD(f0, fˆ)] ≥ 3
4
a = Ω
(
min
{
1
2
,
T 1.5σ√
m
})
.
5 Diffusion on Graphs
In this section we generalise to diffusion on an arbitrary graph. As usual, our aim is to protect the
exact location of a source, while allowing the neighbourhood to be revealed. Diffusion on graphs models
not only heat spread in a graph, but also the path of a random walker in a graph and the spread of
13
Table 2: Examples of ∆2(AG) for some standard graphs. Each graph has n nodes.
G ∆2(AG)
2
Complete graph 2e−τn
Star graph e−2τn +
(
e−τn−e−τ
n−1
)2
+
(
e−τn−e−τ
n−1 + e
−τ
)2
rumours, viruses or information in a social network. A motivating example is whisper networks where
participants share information that they would not like attributed to them. We would like people to
be able to spread information without fear of retribution, but also be able to approximately locate
the source of misinformation. The work in this section does not directly solve this problem since in
our setting each node’s data corresponds to their probability of knowing the rumour, rather than a
binary yes/no variable. In future work, we would like to extend this work to designing whisper network
systems with differential privacy guarantees. If a graph displays a community structure, then we would
like to determine which community the source is in, without being able to isolate an individual person
within that community.
Let G be a connected, undirected graph with n nodes. The n × n matrix W contains the edge
weights so Wij = Wji is the weight of the edge between node i and node j and the diagonal matrix
D has Dii equal to the sum of the i-th row of W . The graph Laplacian is L = D −W . As above, we
also have a parameter controlling the rate of diffusion τ . Then if the initial distribution is given by f0
then the distribution after diffusion is given by the linear equation y = e−τLf0 Thanou et al. [2017].
We will use AG to denote the matrix e
−τL. Note that, unlike in the previous section, we have no heat
leaving the domain (i.e., the boundary conditions are different).
The graph G has a metric on the nodes given by the shortest path between any two nodes. Recall
that in Lemma 7 we can express the amount of noise needed for privacy, ∆2(AG), in terms of the
spectrum of AG. Let s1 ≤ s2 ≤ · · · ≤ smin{n,m} be the eigenvalues of L then e−τs1 ≥ · · · ≥ e−τsmin{m,n}
are the eigenvalues of AG. For any connected graph G, the Laplacian L is positive semidefinite and 0
is a eigenvalue with multiplicity 1 and eigenvector the all-ones vector.
Lemma 18 For any graph G,
∆2(AG) ≤
min{n,m}∑
k=2
e−τsi |(Ui)k − (Uj)k|,
where Ui is the ith row of the matrix whose columns are the left singular vectors of L.
Proof: With set-up as in Lemma 7 we have
‖(AG)i − (AG)j‖2 = ‖
∑
k
e−τsk((Uk)i − (Uk)j)Vk‖2 ≤
∑
k
e−τsk |(Uk)i − (Uk)j |
Since the first eigenvector of L is the all ones vector, we |(U1)i − (U1)j | = 0.
An immediate consequence of Lemma 18 is that ∆2(AG) is bounded above by
e−τs2‖Ui − Uj‖1.
The second smallest eigenvalue of L, s2, (called the algebraic connectivity) is related to the connectivity
of the graph, in particular the graphs expanding properties, maximum cut, diameter and mean distance
[Mohar, 1991]. As the graph becomes more connected, the rate of diffusion increases so the amount of
14
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Figure 3: f0 has a unit peak at one of the nodes on the left side. The graph G was drawn from
a stochastic block model with intercommuntiy probability 5% and intracommunity probability 0.1%.
The parameters are τ = 2, n = 500, δ = 0.1,  = 4.
noise needed for privacy decreases. The dependence on the rows of the matrix of left singular vectors
is intriguing as these rows arise in several other areas of numerical analysis. Their `2 norms are called
leverage scores Drineas et al. [2012] and they appear in graph clustering algorithms.
Figure 3 shows the average behaviour of Algorithm 1 on a graph with community structure. Pre-
liminary experiments suggest that provided τ is not too large or too small and  is not too small, the
correct community is recovered.
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6 Appendix
We need some machinery before we can prove Theorem 14. The following lemma is from Li et al.
[2014]. Since T = µt is fixed we will let g(x) = g(x, t).
Lemma 19 [Li et al., 2014] Suppose s1 < x < s2 and |s1 − s2| ≤
√
2T and consider the function
W (z) = −g′(s2 − x)g(z − s1)− g′(x− s1)g(s2 − z). Then W (z) has a single maximum at x and
W (x)−W (z)

> W (x)−W (s2 −
√
2T ) for z ≤ s2 −
√
2T
≥ C1‖z − x‖22 for z ∈ [s2 −
√
2T , s1 +
√
2T ]
> W (x)−W (s1 +
√
2T ) for z ≥ s1 +
√
2T
where C1 = infz∈[s2−
√
2T ,s1+
√
2T ][−W ′′(z)/2] > 0.
The following two lemmas are necessary for our proof of Theorem 14. For all i ∈ [k] and j ∈ [p], let
Wij(z) = −g′(sij+p − xi)g(z − sij )− g′(xi − sij )g(sij+p − z). Let p = m
√
T/2. We will often replace
the distance between sij and sij+p with
√
T/2 since it is asymptotically equal to the true distance
p/m = bm√T/c/m in m.
Lemma 20 Using the assumptions of Theorem 14 we have
p∑
j=1
inf
z∈[sij+p−
√
2T ,sij+
√
2T ]
[−W ′′ij(z)/2] ≥ Ω
(
m
√
T/8 + 1
T 2.5
)
Proof: Note first that sij+p − x1 =
√
T/2 − (xi − sij ) and sij+p − z =
√
T/2 − (z − sij ) for any
z ∈ [sij+p −
√
2T , sij +
√
2T ]. Let z ∈ [sij+p −
√
2T , sij +
√
2T ] then
−W ′′ij(z) = g′(sij+p − xi)g′′(z − sij ) + g′(xi − sij )g′′(sij+p − z)
=
1
16piT 3
[
(sij+p − xi)
(
1− (z − sij )
2
4T
)
e
−(sij+p−xi)
2−(z−sij )
2
4T
+ (xi − sij )
(
1− (sij+p − z)
2
4T
)
e
−(xi−sij )
2−(sij+p−z)
2
4T
]
≥ 1
2T
√
4piT
1
2T
√
4piT
e
−5
8
[
(sij+p − xi)
(
1− (z − sij )
2
4T
)
+ (xi − sij )
(
1− (sij+p − z)
2
4T
)]
≥ e
−5
8
16piT 3
min{(sij+p − xi), (xi − sij )}
(
2− (z − sij )
2
4T
− (sij+p − z)
2
4T
)
≥ e
−5
8
16piT 3
min{(sij+p − xi), (xi − sij )}
3
4
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Therefore,
p∑
j=1
inf
z∈[sij+p−
√
2T ,sij+
√
2T ]
[−W ′′ij(z)/2] ≥
3e
−5
8
64piT 3
p∑
j=1
min{(sij+p − xi), (xi − sij )}
=
3e
−5
8
64piT 3
2
p/2∑
i=1
i
m
=
3e
−5
8
64piT 3
2
m
√
T/8(m
√
T/8 + 1)
2m
Lemma 21 Using the assumptions of Theorem 14 we have
min
i∈[k]
min
l:l/n6∈Si
p∑
j=1
(Wij(xi)−Wij(l/n)) = Ω
(
m
√
T/2(m
√
T/2 + 1)2
m2
1
T 3.5
)
.
Proof: From Lemma 19 we know for all l s.t. l/n 6∈ Si we have
Wij(xi)−Wij(l/n) ≥ min{Wij(xi)−Wij(sij+p −
√
2T ),Wij(xi)−Wij(sij +
√
2T )}.
Let’s start with
Wij(xi)−Wij(sij+p −
√
2T )
= −g′(sij+p − xi)
(
g(xi − sij )− g(sij+p −
√
2T − sij )
)
− g′(xi − sij )
(
g(sij+p − xi)− g(
√
2T )
)
.
Now, g(z) is concave down for z ∈ [−√2T ,√2T ] and λ-strongly concave on the interval [−√T/2,√T/2]
with λ = −7
16
√
4piT 1.5
e
−1
8 so
g(x)− g(y)
{
≥ −g′(x)(y − x) for x, z ∈ [−√2T ,√2T ]
≥ −g′(x)(y − x) + 7
32
√
4piT 1.5
e
−1
8 (y − x)2 for x, z ∈ [−√T/2,√T/2]
Thus, since |sij+p − sij | = p/m ∼
√
T/2 and |xi − sij | ≤
√
T/2 and |sij+p − xi| ≤
√
T/2 we have
Wij(xi)−Wij(sij+p −
√
2T )
≥ −g′(sij+p − xi)
(
− g′(xi − sij )(sij+p − xi −
√
2T )
+
7
32
√
4piT 1.5
e
−1
8 (sij+p − xi −
√
2T )2
)
− g′(xi − sij )
(
−g′(sij+p − xi)(
√
2T − sij+p − xi)
)
= g′(sij+p − xi)g′(xi − sij )
7
32
√
4piT 1.5
e
−1
8 (sij+p − xi −
√
2T )2
≥ (sij+p − xi)(xi − sij )e
−(sij+p−xi)
2−(xi−sij )
2
4T
7
512
√
4piT 3.5
e
−1
8
≥ (sij+p − xi)(xi − sij )e
−1
8
7
512
√
4piT 3.5
e
−1
8
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where the last inequality follow since 0 ≤ xi − sij =
√
T/2− (sij+p − xi) ≤
√
T/2. Now,
p∑
j=1
(sij+p − xi)(xi − sij ) ≥
p∑
j=1
j
m
(
√
T/2− j
m
)
=
p(p+ 1)(3m
√
T/2− 2p− 1)
6m2
∼ m
√
T/2(m
√
T/2 + 1)2
6m2
We can now turn to our proof of the upper bound on the EMD error of Algorithm 1.
Proof: [Proof of Theorem 14] Note that from Lemma 10, w.h.p. f0 is a feasible point so ‖fˆ‖1 ≤ k.
Let Si = (xi −
√
T/2, xi +
√
T/2)∩ [0, 1] for i ∈ [k]. Then we have that the Si’s are disjoint and each
interval Si contains
√
2Tm sensors. Let p = b√T/2mc and let si1 < · · · < sip be the locations of the
sensors in Si to the left of xi and sip+1 > · · · > si2p be the locations to the right. By Condition 3 we
know that for any pair l ∈ Ti and scj where i 6= c we have |l/n− scj | ≥ A.
For all i ∈ [k] and j ∈ [p], let
Wij(z) = −g′(sij+p − xi)g(z − sij )− g′(xi − sij )g(sij+p − z).
Let Ti be the set of all l ∈ [n] such that l/n ∈ (xi − |xi−xi−1|2 ) ∩ [0, 1] then
g(xi − sij )−
∑
l∈Ti
fˆlg(l/n− sij ) ≤ yij − yˆij +
‖xˆ‖1√
4piT
e
−A2
4T .
Therefore,
k∑
i=1
p∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣Wij(xi)−∑
l∈Ti
fˆlWij(l/n)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
k∑
i=1
p∑
j=1
[
− g′(sj+p − xi)
∣∣∣∣∣g(xi − sij )−∑
l∈Ti
fˆlg(l/n− sij )
∣∣∣∣∣
− g′(xi − sij )
∣∣∣∣∣g(sij+p − xi)−∑
l∈Ti
fˆlg(sij − l/n)
∣∣∣∣∣
]
≤ C2
[
‖y − yˆ‖1 + 2p‖xˆ‖1√
4piT
e
−A2
4T
]
≤ C2
[√
m‖y − yˆ‖2 + 2p‖xˆ‖1√
4piT
e
−A2
4T
]
≤ C2
[
2σm+
mk√
2pi
e
−A2
4T
]
where C2 = maxi∈[k] maxj∈[2p][−g′(|sij −xi|)] and the last inequality holds with high probability from
Lemma 10. Also,
Wij(xi) ≤ −g′(sij+p − xi)g(xi − sij )− g′(xi − sij )g(sij+p − xi)
≤ 1
16piT 2
|sij+p − xi|+
1
16piT 2
|xi − sij |
≤ 1
8piT 1.5
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Therefore, since
∑
`∈Ti fˆ` ≤ 1 we have
k∑
i=1
p∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣Wij(xi)−∑
l∈Ti
fˆlWij(l/n)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ min
{
km
8piT
, C2
[
2σm+
mk√
2pi
e
−A2
4T
]}
= B.
Conversely, by Lemma 19, we have
k∑
i=1
p∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣Wij(xi)−∑
l∈Ti
fˆlWij(l/n)
∣∣∣∣∣
≥
p∑
j=1
[
k∑
i=1
(
1−
∑
l∈Ti
fˆl
)
Wij(xi) +
k∑
i=1
∑
l∈Ti
fˆl(Wij(xi)−Wij(l/n))
]
≥
p∑
j=1
k∑
i=1
(
1−
∑
l∈Ti
fˆl
)
Wij(xi) +
p∑
j=1
k∑
i=1
∑
l:l/n∈Si
fˆlC
j
1(xi − l/n)2 +
k∑
i=1
∑
l:l/n6∈Si
C3fˆl
≥
p∑
j=1
k∑
i=1
(
1−
∑
l∈Ti
fˆl
)
Wij(xi) + C5
k∑
i=1
∑
l:l/n∈Si
fˆl(xi − l/n)2 +
k∑
i=1
∑
l:l/n6∈Si
C3fˆl
where C3 = mini∈[k] minl:l/n6∈Si
∑p
j=1(Wij(xi)−Wij(l/n)) ≥ 0.
Now, by the uniformity of the sensor locations, Wj = Wij (xi) = Wi′j (xi′) so
p∑
j=1
k∑
i=1
(
1−
∑
l∈Ti
fˆl
)
Wij(xi) =
p∑
j=1
k∑
i=1
(
1−
∑
l∈Ti
fˆl
)
Wj ≥
p∑
j=1
Wj(k − ‖fˆ‖1) ≥ 0.
Similarly the other two terms are both positive. Therefore,
∑k
i=1
∑
l:l/n6∈Si fˆl ≤ B/C3 or equivalently,
k∑
i=1
∑
l:l/n∈Si
fˆl ≥ ‖fˆ‖1 −min{k,B/C3}.
This implies that most of the weight of the estimate fˆ is contained in the intervals S1, · · · , Sk. Also,
B ≥
p∑
j=1
|Wij(xi)−
∑
i∈Ti
fˆlWij(l/n)|
≥
p∑
j=1
Wij(xi)−
∑
i∈Ti
fˆlWij(xi)
≥
 p∑
j=1
Wij(xi)
(1−∑
l∈Ti
fˆl
)
= C4
(
1−
∑
l∈Ti
fˆl
)
Therefore,
∑
l∈Ti fˆl ≥ 1−min{1, B/C4} and∑
l:l/n∈Si
fˆl ≤
∑
l∈Ti
fˆl = ‖fˆ‖1 −
∑
a6=i
∑
l∈Ta
fˆl
≤ ‖fˆ‖1 − (k − 1)(1−min{1, B/C4}) ≤ 1 + (k − 1) min{1, B/C4}.
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This implies that the weight of estimate fˆ contained in the interval Si is not too much larger than the
true weight of 1. Also,∑
l:l/n∈Si fˆl
‖fˆ‖1
≤ 1 + (k − 1) min{1, B/C4}
k(1−min{1, B/C4}) =
1
k
+
min{1, B/C4}
1−min{1, B/C4}
In order to upper bound the EMD( f0k ,
fˆ
‖fˆ‖1 ) we need a flow, we are going to assign weight
min{
∑
l:l/n∈Si fˆl
‖fˆ‖1
,
1
k
}
to travel to xi from within Si. The remaining unassigned weight is at most
k
min{1, B/C4}
1−min{1, B/C4} +
min{1, B/C3}
k(1−min{1, B/C4})
and this weight can travel at most 1 unit in any flow. Therefore,
EMD
(
f0
k
,
fˆ
‖fˆ‖1
)
≤
k∑
i=1
∑
l:l/n∈Si
fˆl
‖fˆ‖1
|xi − l/n|+ k min{1, B/C4}
1−min{1, B/C4} +
min{1, B/C3}
k(1−min{1, B/C4})
≤ 1
k(1−min{1, B/C4})
√
B
C5
+ k
min{1, B/C4}
1−min{1, B/C4} +
min{1, B/C3}
k(1−min{1, B/C4}) (5)
Now, we need bounds on C1, C2, C3 and C4. Firstly, recall
C1 = inf
z∈[s2−
√
2T ,s1+
√
2T ]
[−W ′′(z)/2] > 0.
The sensors sij and sij+p are at a distance of p/m and recall that we only chose the sensors such
that |xi − sij | ≥ 1/m. Thus, any z ∈ [s2 −
√
2T , s1 +
√
2T ] we have either |z − sij | ≤
√
T/8 or
|z − sij+p | ≤
√
T/8 so
−W ′′(z) = g′(sij+p − xi)g′′(z − sij ) + g′(xi − sij )g′′(sij+p − z) ≥
1
16piT 3
(
1
m
(
1− 1
2T
T
8
)
e−
1
4T
T
8
)
Therefore, C1 ≥ 17e
−1
32
512
1
m
1
T 3 . Next,
C2 = max
i∈[k]
max
j∈[2p]
−g′(|xi − sj |) ≤ 1
2
√
4piT
e
−1
4m2T .
By Lemma 21 we have,
C3 = min
i∈[k]
min
l:l/n6∈Si
p∑
j=1
(Wij(xi)−Wij(l/n)) = Ω
(
m
√
T/2(m
√
T/2 + 1)2
m2
1
T 3.5
)
.
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Finally,
C4 =
p∑
j=1
Wij(xi)
=
1
8piT 2
p∑
j=1
(sij+p − xi)e
−(sij+p−xi)
2−(xi−sij )
2
4T + (xi − sij )e
−(sij+p−xi)
2−(xi−sij )
2
4T
≥ 1
8piT 2
e
−1
8
p∑
j=1
(sij+p − sij )
≥ Ω
(
me
−1
8
16piT
)
.
Lemma 20 gives C5 = Ω
(
m
√
T/8+1
T 2.5
)
. Putting all our bounds into (5) we gain the final result.
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